Tawazun - Indicators | Defense Finances & Economics

The Index measures the relative efficiency of civil-military relations. Efficiency is defined as the ability of civilian and military actors to negotiate, formulate, and coordinate policies in the sphere of national defense, in ways that further effective governance of the defense sector, reinforce state core competences, and enhance nation building.

The Index includes five domains, each comprising a set of main questions and indicators. Rationales for each domain and main question clarify their relevance in measuring the efficiency of civil-military relations. The index is designed in question format, allowing respondents to answer each indicator on a scale.

Defense Finances & Economics

In any country, the military consumes a significant part of the state budget, and the efficient use of resources, including transparent budgeting and efficient financial management and monitoring, is an important indicator of the state of civil-military relations. Given that military purchases and employment contribute to the economic life of the country, and that the military may control economic assets, efficient civil-military relations are served by effective institutional control and transparency of defense economics.

Q1. Who determines the defense budget and its distribution?

A clear process for setting the overall national defense budget, and for making the most effective and efficient use of this budget through the distribution of funds throughout the different elements of the military, preserves the public good over parochial interests. Safeguards against misuse and corruption also suggest more efficient civil-military relations.

To what extent is the process for developing the defense budget similar to that for civilian agencies?

Not at all.
To a limited extent: There are some technical and methodological similarities, but also significant discrepancies, and the defense budget is not subject to similar oversight or transparency.
To some extent: There are technical and methodological similarities and select civilian agencies are involved in the process.
To a great extent: The same process is followed, with similar safeguards and provisions for oversight by qualified civilian agencies.

To what extent do civilian authorities exercise meaningful oversight over the defense budget (ratifying and monitoring its implementation)?

Not at all: The detail of the defense budget is formally excluded from legislative oversight and from the purview of all but the narrowest civilian authorities.
To a limited extent: Civilian oversight is narrowly proscribed and generally ineffective.
To some extent: Civilian authorities have partial oversight and are partially effective.
Considerably: Civilian authorities exercise meaningful, formal oversight.

Is the defense budget transparent, showing key items of expenditure as well as sources of income outside the budget (for example from sale of equipment or other assets and services, and foreign military assistance)?

Not transparent.
Limited transparency: Most key items are not shown.
Some transparency: Some key items are shown but not all.
Considerable transparency: All key items of expenditure and income are shown.

Does the military hold special funds that are not subject to approval or scrutiny by qualified civilian authorities?

The military holds funds that do not come under meaningful external scrutiny.
The military holds funds that are nominally subject to external scrutiny, but it is left to manage these funds autonomously.
The military holds some funds that are subject to scrutiny by a narrow range of civilian agencies.
No special funds are held off-the-books, or else are subject to full external scrutiny.

Do civilian agencies have the authority and means in place to audit the defense sector and to counter corruption risks in defense procurement?

No, civilian agencies lack the formal authority and means.
Civilian agencies have some nominal authority and means but these are largely inactive or ineffective.
Civilian agencies have some formal authority and means that are partly active and effective.
Yes, civilian agencies have the formal authority and means to exercise it actively and effectively.

Does the military have effective and transparent means in place (including supporting legislation, codes of conduct, and internal oversight mechanisms) for dealing with corruption risks in defense procurement (from initial assessment of needs, through contract implementation and sign-off, to asset disposal)?

No, very few or no means are in place and are largely or wholly inactive and/or ineffective.
Nominal means are in place but are largely inactive or ineffective.
Some means are in place and are partly active and effective.
Yes, extensive means are in place and are active and effective.

Is public debate of the defense budget and of financial audits of the defense sector permitted and made possible (through release of relevant details)?

No: Public debate is formally prohibited.
To a limited extent: A de facto prohibition is in place and public debate is actively discouraged by de facto restrictions.
To some extent: Public debate is permitted, but impeded by lack of information or responsiveness by relevant military or civilian authorities.
Considerably: Public debate is permitted and possible.

Does the military have a formal or de facto policy of openness towards and engagement with nongovernmental organizations and media in relation to defense finances?

No, the military has a formal or de facto policy of non-openness on defense finances, and is generally hostile to engagement with nongovernmental organizations and media.
The military does not have a formal or de facto policy of openness or non-openness defense finances, but actively avoids engagement with nongovernmental organizations and media.
The military has a de facto policy of openness on defense finances towards and engagement with nongovernmental organizations and media, but this may be limited or inconsistent.
Yes, the military has a formal policy of openness on defense finances towards and engagement with nongovernmental organizations and media.

Q2. Is the military involved in business and economic activity?

The more widely the military is engaged in the economy, the more likely it is to influence civilian authorities in the country to defend parochial military interests, resulting in less efficient civil-military relations and undermining development of military capabilities and professionalism.

Does the military have or invest in extensive formally registered businesses or undertake significant commercial activities as part of its official duties?

Yes, the military has a significant and formal role in business or the economy.
The military has a significant role in business or the economy but this is de facto.
The military has a relatively limited and circumscribed role in business or the economy, whether formal or de facto.
The military is legally prevented from being involved in business or the economy.

Are businesses or commercial activities in which the military is involved subject to the same laws (including social security, health, and safety) and obligations (public disclosure and financial audit) as civilian counterparts?

The laws and obligations are very dissimilar.
There are major differences in laws and obligations.
The laws and obligations are somewhat similar, with some differences.
The laws and obligations are very similar.

Does the military play any role in the commercial exploitation of the country’s natural resources, and if so, is this subject to public disclosure and official financial audit?

Yes, the military is heavily involved in commercial exploitation of natural resources, with little or no public disclosure and audit.
The military is somewhat involved in commercial exploitation of natural resources, with inactive or ineffective public disclosure and audit.
The military is generally not involved in commercial exploitation of natural resources, but not subject to public disclosure and audit.
No, the military is not involved in commercial exploitation of natural recourses, and is subject to full public disclosure and official financial audit.

Are the incomes from the businesses and commercial activities in which the military is involved retained by the military or passed on to the treasury?

Wholly retained by the military.
Mainly retained by the military, with the military passing some income to the treasury.
Mainly passed to the treasury, with the military retaining some income.
Wholly passed on to the treasury.

Does the military derive extra-budgetary income from services or support contracts (peacekeeping, demining, financing packages or transport and insurance contracts relating to arms deals) that are not reported or passed back to the treasury?

Extra-budgetary income is routinely not reported or passed back to the treasury.
Extra-budgetary income is reported but not passed back to the treasury.
Extra-budgetary income is reported and some is passed back to the treasury.
Extra-budgetary income is routinely reported and passed back to the treasury.

Does the military use activities such as construction or assets such as facilities and real estate to acquire non-budgetary income, and in this case does it report or pass this income back to the treasury?

Yes, the military acquires significant non-budgetary income, but this is routinely not reported or passed back to the treasury.
The military acquires some non-budgetary income, which is reported but not passed back to the treasury.
The military acquires some non-budgetary income, which it reports and passes back to the treasury.
No, the military does not acquire non-budgetary income.

Do defense sector personnel (military or civilian) engage in unauthorized or private business activities?

Considerably.
Often.
Occasionally or rarely.
No, not to any significant extent.

Q3. Does the state budget allocate sufficient funding for defense sector needs?

A clear and transparent budgetary process between civilian authorities and the military is key to determining appropriate funding levels, not only to meet ongoing operations and existing defense needs, but also for future spending on equipment maintenance, upgrades, and replacement, health care, military pensions, and other long-term personnel costs (including family education and housing). This moreover reduces the likelihood that the military will seek extra-budgetary income streams, engage in corrupt practices, or interfere with economic policy.

Do both civilian authorities and the military have a good grasp of the connection between national defense goals and available resources (financial and other)?

They generally do not.
Unevenly and inconsistently.
Sometimes, but this could be better assured and managed.
They generally do.

How effective is the institutional mechanism for developing and negotiating defense funding needs?

Not effective at all.
Limited effectiveness.
Somewhat effective.
Highly effective.

Are significant defense costs routinely removed from the defense budget and charged to the general budget instead (including hidden under non-military items)?

To a great extent.
To some extent.
To a limited extent.
Not at all.

How commensurate are scales of pay, benefits, and allowances in the defense sector compared to those in the rest of the public sector?

Not commensurate at all.
Slightly commensurate.
Moderately commensurate.
Highly commensurate.

How commensurate are pensions in the defense sector compared with those in the rest of the public sector?

Not commensurate at all.
Slightly commensurate.
Moderately commensurate.
Highly commensurate.

Are the rates and overall amounts of pay and pensions for defense sector personnel (military and civilian) accurately known and available for public debate (by ministers, parliament, and civilians outside government)?

Not at all.
To a limited extent.
To some extent.
To a high extent.

To what extent does the negotiation of arms deals and foreign military assistance reflect actual defense sector needs as opposed to political agendas, parochial interests, or personal enrichment?

Political agendas, parochial interests, or personal enrichment are very significant.
Political agendas, parochial interests, or personal enrichment are significant, but there is a trade-off with defense needs.
Defense needs are prioritized, but political agendas, parochial interests, or personal enrichment play some role.
Defense needs are the determining factor, political agendas, parochial interests, or personal enrichment play a minimal role.